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Historically, the link between the evidence that a medical
technology is worthwhile and its acceptance or rejection by
aecision-makers has not been an especially strong one. The current
interest in "technology assessment" has aimed to alter that state of
affairs and to narrow the gap. Technology assessment seeks to settle a
controversy through analysis, evaluation, or consensus. But, settlement
of the controversy does not necessarily result in changes in practitioner
behavior. We propose an agenda for an assessment of assessments
themselves in order to learn how to enhance the relationship between
scientific evidence and medical practice and ultimately, to improve the
quality of medical care.
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MEDICAL EVIDENCE AND CLINICAL PRACTICE: HOW CAN
TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT NARROW THE GAP?
1. INTRODUCTION
It is commonly stated that remarkable technological advances in
medical diagnosis, treatment, rehabilitation, and prevention have taken
place since the second World War. Only recently, however, has the extent
to which medical or scientific evidence justifies their adoption and use
been seriously questioned.
Historically, the relationship between the evidence that a medical
technology is worthwhile and its acceptance or rejection by
decision-makers has not been an especially strong one. However, the
current interest in "technology assessment," that has involved such
institutions as the National Institutes of Health, the Institute of
Medicine and a number of groups and individuals from academia, industry,
and government, has aimed to alter that state of affairs and narrow the
gap. by technology assessment, we refer to policy-mandated, systematic
attempts to advance the efficacious use of medical technologies and
practices.
in this article we explore some of the determinants of clinical
practice and examine the manner in which medical evidence and technology
assessment change the treatments or diagnostic tests that physicians
prescribe for their patients. We consider the mechanism through which
four current policies, all forms of technology assessment, could help to
make clinical practice more scientific.
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II. CLINICAL PRACTICE AND ITS DETERMINANTS
When a patient presents with a set of symptoms and signs which the
clinician recognizes as a familiar pattern, the response is to order
appropriate diagnostic tests or treatment. Each practitioner probably
has a collection of algorithms for dealing with those recognizable
patterns. The summation of one individual's algorithms over the universe
of patient presentations might be referred to as that physician's
clinical practice.l
Clinical practice by a typical doctor would be expected to evolve
over time based upon education, practical experience, and the collective
experience of professional colleagues. Algorithms which include the use
of drugs, procedures and other technologies are continually updated or
discarded according to new information. But how much of the information
is based upon medical or scientific evidence remains an open question.
In order for medical evidence to influence the adoption of a new
technology or the abandonment of an established one, there needs to be an
information base, generated through research or other means, which
describes the clinical application of the technology in question. That
information needs to be interpreted and then communicated to the
practitioners to whom it relates. A physician may then make a tentative
decision to accept or reject the information as a basis for changing
practice. A tentative change may become a permanent change after
"learning by doing" corroborates its value. If these events occur in an
effective and timely fashion, then the relationship between medical
evidence and clinical practice should be quite strong.
III
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Technology assessment potentially influences acceptance or
rejection of clinical practices at two points in the process. First, it
can occur after the generation of the research base, but before
practitioners can gain access to the technology for use on their
patients. Second, there also is a role for technology assessment later
on, after a technology has been adopted and may even be in wide use.
III. THE GAP BETWEEN MEDICAL EVIDENCE AND CLINICAL PRACTICE
In reality, however, each of the above described determinants of
change in clinical practice is prone to defects which serve to weaken the
influence of medical evidence. The information base (assuming that it
exists) itself can be defective because of poor research or study
design. The information can be of high quality, but the object of
misinterpretation. Communication of the information base may be either
inadequate or misdirected. And, there may be an excessive reliahce on
the observations made while "learning by doing." We discuss each of
these problems in turn.
A. Oefects in the information base or its interpretation.
Inadequacies in clinical information bases have received wide
attention in recent years. There are at least two aspects to this
problem. First, for many technologies, is the paucity of evaluative data
which are based on legitimately designed efficacy trials. The second
aspect is the considerable room for misinterpretation of the data
generated from even well-designed research studies.
The quality of the clinical research bases has been addressed by
others. Fletcher and Fletcher considered the trends in designing
clinical research studies over the 30 year.period from 1945 - 75 and
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confirmed the current emphasis on randomized controlled efficacy
trials.2 Amounting to 10% of clinical research recently reported in
major journals, studies of this type were essentially non-existent thirty
years ago. But, disappointingly, they reported far greater reliance
tooay on single case reports than on the usually better designed case
control and cohort studies as compared to thirty years ago. Fineberg, in
his study of the evolution of the gastric freezing technique to treat
ulcer disease, found that efficacy data deriving from decently designed
studies did not become available until well after the technique had
Decome widely accepted and then largely rejected.3 The clinical
research data that eventually was reported failed to find the technology
to be efficacious.4 Wennberg and Bunker describe substantial variation
in rates of utilization of various common surgical procedures in
different populations without significant effects on aggregate health
measures of these populations and without apparent information bases with
which to establish selection criteria for patients who might undergo
those procedures.5
There have also been problems noted with the use of information
deriving from clinical research that had been properly designed but not
adequately interpreted. Eddy describes and catalogues a number of errors
in analyzing and interpreting clinical research studies.l' 6 An example
would be the errors in probabilistic reasoning in which he found
researchers to have systematically confused the sensitivity of
mammography in the diagnosis of breast cancer with its predictive value
in discriminating between the presence and absence of disease.
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B. Pitfalls in the communication of the information base
Even if the information and research bases are adequate and they
have been properly interpreted, they need to be effectively communicated
to the target practitioners in order for them to be important
determinants of clinical practice. Defects in the communication process
can be of at least three possible kinds. The wrong information can be
given to the right people; the right information can be targeted to the
wrong audience; or, the wrong information can be communicated to the
wrong audience.
Researchers have in the past been interested in finding out through
what communication channels doctors become informed of the existence of
new technologies. 7,8,9,10 There has been less attention paid to the
content of this information and, in particular, how much of it relates to
medical evidence.ll'12
The classic study of the communication of a pharmaceutical
innovation was carried out by Coleman, Katz, and Menzel in the 1950s.9
This major empirical study examined the adoption process associated with
a new antibiotic drug, "gammanym", the third in a series of related
pharmaceuticals, following "alphanym" and "betanym". Their study
utilized prescription records of physicians practicing in three
mid-western communities, and also included structured interviews with the
physicians about the determinants of their drug adoption behavior, the
nature of their practices, and the structure of the colleague networks
with whom or through whom they communicated. The findings from their
study suggested a two-step process by which physicians learn about and go
onto adopt new drugs. The first step involves opinion leaders, highly
respected physicians practicing in the communities, who find out about
"r^-Y"-"-----
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the new drug innovations from external sources, predominantly drug
manufacturers' promotional activity. The bulk of the practitioners,
however, adopted gammanym as a result of a "chain reaction"; that is,
they learned about it from the colleagues with whom they regularly
communicated informally.
Gammanym and its predecessor drugs were not identified by name in
the Coleman, Katz, and Menzel study. We believe them to have
corresponded to tetracycline and two of its chemically similar
derivatives. It is recognized today that the pharmacologic actions of
and indications for all three agents are quite similar. The
communication patterns that were responsible for effecting the adoption
of gammanym therefore either were independent of any real information
about the relative efficacies of the alternative drugs, or the popular
perceptions and interpretations of that information base were wrong.
Another potential problem in the communication of information about
medical practices that may lead to change in clinical practice is that
the information may be communicated via channels that do not reach a
substantial fraction and possibly the most important segment of the
target audience. Allen and others have written about the structure of
professional communication among scientists as compared to
engineers.13 Scientists doubtless are concerned about the desire to
disseminate the substance of their scientific findings, but tend also to
seek to maximize recognition because professional career development
depends largely upon it. Engineers, on the other hand, may be relatively
more concerned with communications directed toward solutions to technical
problems leading to practical applications. Informal types of
communication may be more important in achieving the objectives of the
engineers.
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Clinical researchers very likely see themselves as "scientists" and
seek to publish their finding in prestigious journals in order to
maximize recognition. These research-oriented journals, as Young points
out, may have greater interest in describing research methodology than in
communicating the details of guidelines for implementing change in
clinical practice.l2 Also, these research-oriented journals may not be
the best places to publish if the objective is to reach a specific
audience of practitioners because the journals may not be read by
important segments of the target audience.
C. Excessive Reliance on "learning by Doing"
Of a national sample of practitioners surveyed by Finkelstein and
colleagues, over three-fourths considered their own experiences with the
use of drugs and other medical technologies to be a highly important
determinant of their clinical practices.l4 "Learning by doing" has its
place in certain aspects of medical practice, especially those which
require the acquisition of skills that become refined with experience.
Luft, Bunker, and Enthoven found an important empirical relationship
between experience and outcome for a selection of surgical
procedures.l5 However, in many other kinds of practice, there may be a
tendency to place too much reliance on one's own personal observations of
the use of a drug, procedure, or other technology.
In some sense, medical practitioners appear to be involved in a
sort of clinical feedback loop. Conducting ongoing, uncontrolled,
unrandomized studies, they rely at least partly on their own experiences
and those of their colleagues to update expectations about the clinical
value of specific treatments. Provided that the feedback is not
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significantly contrary to prior beliefs, practice is not greatly
modified. In fact, the positive nature of feedback from experience may
encourage even broader use of the therapy.
There are at least two major problems with these "own experience
trials". First are potential biases in measures of association or effect
which are introduced due to differential selection of patients into the
treatment group. Second and equally important, especially in cases where
the occurrence of disease is low, there is a high likelihood that a
practitioners decision will be based on an inadequate number of
observations.
The biases potentially arising from the use of uncontrolled,
unrandomized study designs have been widely recognized and discussed in
the literature. The representativeness of the experimental treatment
group is essential if one wishes to generalize the results of specific
patient cases to all patients. Randomization has been shown to be an
effective method for reducing the chance that confounding characteristics
of the patient group will bias conclusions. A practice thought to be
effective in an individual practice setting may well be found otherwise
when subjected to more rigorously designed clinical trial research.
The second important issue addressed in the design of clinical
experiments is the determination of an adequate sample size. As was
shown y Freiman, Chalmers, et al., insufficient numbers of clinical
observations can lead to the improper rejection of superior forms of
therapy.l6 The confidence with which any statement can be made
increases with the amount of data there is to back it up, and there are
quantitative rules for assessing the adequacy of the sample size. These
formulas are based on the underlying incidence rate of the phenomenon
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being studied, the expected observable change due to intervention, and
the decision-makers required level of confidence.
Temin's work on physician drug prescribing behavior casts serious
doubt on the value of "learning by doing" for at least one type of
medical practice.ll'1 7 Using data from a national prescription survey,
he found that doctors use each different drug product (different drug or
different brand of drug) an average of less than 12 times a year or
approximately once a month. He also observed that a wide variety of
drugs were used to treat similar diseases. The infrequency with which
doctors use each drug product means that they cannot expect to learn
about the relative merits of competing drugs and competing brands of the
same drug by using them. Even if they have complete enough records to
separate the patients to whom each different drug or brand had been
given, it would take a very long time to accumulate a large enough sample
to show significant differences. In addition, if the drugs or brands to
be compared were not prescribed randomly, the effect or results of even a
large sample would be impossible to interpret.
In the same vein, Finkelstein and colleagues considered whether
surgical practitioners were basing their evaluation of efficacy of
preventive measures for pulmonary embolism on an adequate number of
observations.14 Another way of asking the question is whether the low
incidence of post-operative thromboembolism make it likely that an
individual surgical practitioner would observe enough cases to make a
statistically sound decision. Based upon data derived from a national
random sample of surgical practitioners in which they were asked to
estimate the incidence of pulmonary embolism following surgery, the
fraction of surgical patients receiving prophylactic measures against
__
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pulmonary embolism, and the number of patients seen per surgical practice
per year, it would take nearly 7 years for a typical practitioner to
"validate" the efficacy of one of those measures through "learning by
doing."
D. Mechanism of change in clinical practice
It seems reasonable to propose a mechanism through which medical
evidence leads to changes in clinical practice. One underlying theory
starts with the elementary marketing notion that you have to make people
notice a new product before you can convince them to buy it. The
mechanism, therefore, is two-fold. First, people become aware of the
existence of a recommendation, and second, they are persuaded to follow
7it.
Awareness is an issue because of the multiplicity of information in
the world today. Doctors tend to be overwhelmed with professional
information of many sorts and cannot possibly absorb all of it. Largely
because of this sea of information, physicians act according to what
Temin has called the "customary" mode of behavior, which reflects what
doctors consider to be the norms of their profession, and which may have
been communicated to them through formal (textbooks, journals, seminars)
as well as informal (person to person) means.l7
Once people have become aware of a conflict between their behavior
and some external stimuli, they can shift out of their customary behavior
into "instrumental" behavior in which they reexamine their behavior and
seek to bring it into conformance with the external environment.l7
Instrumental behavior is determined by its effects, while customary
behavior is shaped by the norms of the behavior itself. For example, a
doctor acting instrumentally might avoid performing "experimental"
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procedures on patients because of having learned of clinical trial
findings disputing their effectiveness. While a doctor acting
customarily may automatically include a particular diagnostic test as
part of a clinical algorithm for dealing with a presenting problem
because of it is part of the normal practice at the hospital or in the
group.
To describe the mechanism by which technology assessments might
have their impact, therefore, we have to answer three questions. First,
how do people acting in the customary mode of behavior change behavior?
Second, how do people in the instrumental mode change behavior? And
third, when do people switch from one mode of behavior to the other?
The question of behavior change within the customary mode is of
interest because technology assessment could have an impact without
causing people to shift from customary into instrumental behavior.
Customs do change over time in response to shifts in the social structure
of the medical community and technology assessment could be the cause of
a significant--albeit gradual--effect by this means. Since customs
change slowly, however, it is likely that we may not be able to verify
directly the impact of technology assessments on behavior purely within
the customary mode, particularly of those held in the very recent past.
The question of behavior change within the instrumental mode is
important because we need to know how people utilize information once
they become aware of its importance. Reports of technology assessments
are only one form of medical information. We need to know how they are
received relative to other forms, such as advertisements by
manufacturers. In addition, Kahneman and Tversky and others suggest that
people respond differently to the same information if it is expressed or




The third question--do people switch modes as a result of
technology assessments?--is perhaps the key. It is the area we know least
about and the area in which we suspect the importance of technology
assessments is determined. Behavior change from customary to
instrumental mode may take place rather rapidly. Reports of technology
assessments appear among a wide variety of information sources. We need
to ask which sources of information command attention. The answer may
vary according to the subject matter, the nature of the conclusions, or
time. It may vary according to the location of the recipient. And, of
course, it varies according to characteristics of individuals.
Temin has shown, for example, that doctors' drug prescribing
practices generally are determined in a customary mode.17 That is,
they have strong continuity over time; they change in response to social
pressure within the medical community; and they are only indirectly
related to effectiveness. Prescribing practices are evaluated by
reference to a medical custom or guideline, not by examining the
therapeutic result.
Continuing with the drug prescribing example, it is likely that
neither the medical literature nor doctors' own experience give doctors
the information needed to make an instrumental choice between closely
competing drugs or between competing formulations (brands, generics) of a
single drug. Doctors therefore rely on customary behavior to make their
choices. They respond only to information that comes to them through
their social contacts in the medical community. This is the lesson of
Coleman, Katz and.Menzel's classic study. The new drug, gammanym, was
adopted without reference to its comparative effectiveness (relative to
its earlier competitors, alphanym and betanym), but in accordance with
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the personal contacts within the medical community. This demonstrates
both how change takes place in the customary mode and that change is
possible in this mode.
Doctors switch into an instrumental mode when there is an increase
in the disharmony between their prescribing habits and the therapeutic
context. This could come about either because of a conflict within a
doctor's own practice or because of a conflict exposed by the media. One
important and open question is how to describe or to design information
that will lead doctors to shift from the customary to the instrumental
mode and actively examine alternative therapies.
IV. TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENTS TO NARROW THE GAP?
A number of policies calling for technology assessments have been
implemented or proposed whose main objective is to enhance the
relationship between scientific evidence and clinical practice. Many
people believe that these assessments can also contribute to reducing
costs associated with the use of technologies with questionable
efficacy. However, the particular forms of technology assessment that we
will examine address cost-effectiveness issues only indirectly.
Some forms of technology assessment are binding on the practitioner
in that access to the technology or reimbursement for using it either
would be granted or denied. Other kinds of assessments are largely
voluntary and depend on the development of a consensus within the
professional community. Technology assessment policies can also be
differentiated based on whether they generate a new information base or
re-evaluate an old one; and whether they have an active or passive
dissemination component.
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A. Approval Mechanisms for Drugs and Medical Devices
The Food and Drug Administration approval mechanisms for drugs and
medical devices are examples of technology assessments whose results are
binding, at least in part, on the manufacturers and on the medical
profession. The timing of an assessment is well-defined; it must precede
the acceptance of the practice by physicians. The form of the assessment
is a clinical trial.
The Federal Food and Drug and Cosmetic Act of 1938 required the FDA
to reject an application to market any new drug that the FDA deemed
unsafe. The 1962 Drug Amendments to that law transformed the FDA from a
passive to an active participant in the treatment of new drug
applications (NDAs) -- the FDA had to make an explicit decision on all
NDAs, not just intervene with unsatisfactory ones -- and added efficacy
to the preexisting requirement for safety for new drugs. The 1962 law
also stated more explicitly than the original act how the FDA was to
decide whether a drug was safe and effective. But it was not until 1970
that the FDA issued a regulation interpreting the statute to mean a
clinical trial.
The 1970 regulation said that the "adequate and well-controlled
investigations" cited by the 1962 statute as "substantial evidence" of
safety and efficacy had to include a formal test with explicit
objectives, selection procedures for both subjects and control groups,
observation and recording methods, and statistical analysis. Every study
needed a carefully defined control group fitting into one of four
possible categories. The drug being tested could be compared with a
placebo or another drug known to be active from past studies. Or, the
effects of the drug being tested could be compared with the known results
III
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of no treatment or with historical data on the course of the ailment
without this drug. The FDA clearly tried to spread its net wide to allow
a variety of tests -- so wide in fact that it would be hard to disallow
any clinical investigation on the basis of inadequate controls, since the
study could be allowed in as an example of historical or no-treatment
controls. Clinical experience was ruled out for its informality and lack
of explicit objectives and methods rather than its lack of control.
Following the 1970 regulations, "substantial evidence" of effectiveness
took on a new and expanded meaning. The once good standing of adequate,
documented clinical experience was swept away.
In 1976, the juristiction of the FDA in the assessment of medical
technology was extended even further. In that year Congress enacted the
medical device amendments which gave the FDA the authority to grant or
deny premarket approval for equipment-embodied technologies having human
application. For practical purposes, following these laws, nearly any
piece of medical technology which used a manufactured product that was
not a drug, could now be considered a device. The process for gaining
premarket clearance for a medical device was similar to, but on the whole
less resource intensive than the process required to gain clearance to
market pharmaceuticals. Three classes of devices were established to
reflect different degrees of risk associated with clinical applications.
All devices currently on the market and all new devices were to be
classified in one of these categories. Only the most critical class of
devices was to require premarket approval. Manufacturers desiring to
market new devices were to consider their prospective products as
requiring premarket approval unless it could be shown to have been
substantially equivalent to another device already on the market. Since

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the enactnment of the medical device laws, the FDA has experienced
considerable difficultly in classifying devices already in use.20 Many
aspects of the process of implementation of these laws still remain
uncertain. However, only class three medical devices, before gaining
their premarket approval, need to submit clinical trial data such as that
required for drugs.
The behavior shown by the FDA is consistent with a desire to play
it safe and to err on the side of being, if anything, too conservative,
rather than too permissive. For practical purposes, a denial of
premarket approval by the FDA means that the product or practice is given
no chance to be used and never gets tried by the profession.
The issue of whether FDA approval mechanisms for drugs and medical
devices advance the objectives of the policy makers who promulgated the
laws has been addressed in the published literature. Some authors have
even attempted to compare the costs and benefits of the policies as they
affect society.21 The costs are those of preventing or delaying access
by patients to efficacious and needed products. The benefits would
include any cost avoidance that came about through diminished use of
products without efficacy. This literature falls short of definitively
establishing whether there is a net cost or net benefit to these
policies, because the uncertainties involved in estimating both costs and
benefits are quite large.
Apart from the issues of costs and benefits, there is much that
remains unknown about the clinical trial process required by the FDA in
its premarket approval decision-making. The information submitted by
manufacturers to the FDA is proprietary and not subject to review and
discussion by independent experts. How many of the reports of clinical
III
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trials submitted to the FDA describe studies that have been adequately
designed and correctly interpreted? How the FDA uses the results of
these clinical trials in their decision making is not publicly well
known. It would be of particular interest to learn how the FDA's
evaluates relative weights of safety and efficacy information and how the
outcomes of the approval process depend on these weightings.
In addition to approving a drug for marketing, the FDA approves the
label under which a drug is marketed. Since the label indicates the
specific conditions for which a drug is to be used, the FDA is in theory
controlling not only which drugs are used, but how they are used. But
while there are compelling reasons for doctors to follow the FDA's
instructions -- not the least of which is protection from malpractice
suits -- this part of the regulation seems to be honored largely in the
breach. A study in 1972 found that well over half of the surveyed
hospital-based use of cephalexin, allopurinol and propanolol was not in
accordance with the drugs' labeling.22 And a recent study of
cimetidine usage found that only ten percent of its administrations were
in accord with the label.23 It would be of great value to know if
these few examples are typical of physician behavior or exceptions to a
normally conscientious observance of FDA approval labels. If they
represent the rule rather than the exception, it may be time for the FDA
to rethink its procedures with respect to drug labels.
Many believe that it is a foregone conclusion that the very
existence of the FDA premarket activities enhances the relationship
between medical evidence and clinical practice. However, because much of
this process is not open to public scrutiny and because some of it may
not be affecting physician behavior, the uncertainties as to whether this




B. Third Party Reimbursement Coverage Decision-Making24'25'26
The decision-making process by which medical practitioners are
either granted or denied reimbursement "coverage" for using new
technologies is a second example of a binding technology assessment of
the "consensus" variety. This decision is distinct from the
"reimbursement" decision in which carriers determine the amount of
reimbursement for a procedure or practice. A number of insurance
carriers have established systematic structures, usually committees to
assist in their coverage decision-making. One of the best established is
that of the Medicare program which maintains a "coverage committee"
composed of all the physicians on the staff of the Health Care Financing
Administration as well as some representation from outside the agency.
The committee is chaired by a physician in the senior management of the
agency who considers this function to be one of his principal interests
and responsibilities.
When the Medicare program receives a request to cover a previously
experimental technology, it first initiates a process designed to
elucidate the issues involved. Once the coverage staff are certain they
understand the questions that need to be addressed, they defer to the
Public Health Service via the Office of the Assistant Secretary for
Health for an evaluation of the current state of the art and professional
consensus regarding its use. The Public Health Service coordinates the
"technology assessment by consensus" and serves as a buffer between HCFA
whose budgetary interests might best be served by denying coverage and
the National Institutes of Health, the agency whose mandate includes the
enhancement of the medical applications of research. By statue, a
coverage determination can be based only upon the assessment of clinical
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efficacy and cannot consider the benefits of using the technology in
relation to its costs.25
The Medicare program began to make requests for assessments to the
Public Health Service as early as 1975, however, the process did not
become routine until near the end of the 1970s. The National Blue
Cross/Blue Shield Association, Blue Shield of California and
Massachusetts Blue Cross/Blue Shield are among the other organizations
that have established coverage committees. By preventing the use of
unproven or inefficacious practices, coverage decisions can potentially
enhance the relationship between medical evidence and clinical practice,
and at the same time have a favorable impact on costs.25'26
The coverage decision-making process is very new and, so far as we
are able to determine, has not yet been the object of a systematic
evaluation of its impact. Many of the questions that would need to be
addressed about this process of evaluation by consensus relate to the
content of the consensus letters or statements which the Public Health
Service receives in response to its inquiries to various opinion leaders
and professional societies regarding the use of the practice. It would
be important to determine whether the information these technology
evaluators are receiving is substantially better than that which is
generally available to the practicing physician. Do the coverage
committees have access to unpublished research data? To proprietary
data? Do they rely heavily on the clinical experience of their
advisors? And are there significant differences in opinion about the use
of the technology among the various experts or expert groups whose





These above questions are tantamount to asking whether the
information assembled as part of the coverage decision process typically
contains records of customary behavior, (that is, what people are
actually doing) or instrumental information (that is, genuine attempts to
assess the efficacy of the technologies.) Do vendors or other
identifiable interests influence the process by attempting to saturate
the decision-makers with information supportive of their viewpoint? And
to what extent is the information sought for the consensus dependent on
or independent of the medical researchers or specialists who are
professional advocates for the technology or practice?
The coverage deciSion-making apparatus that has been implemented so
far may be having an impact on other consensus bodies or on other
third-party carriers. It would be as important to determine whether a
negative coverage decision prevents the use of the practice as it would
to examine whether a positive decision affects how effectively one is
used. Some new procedures will not be that distinctly different from
already established and reimburseable procedures. For example, cardiac
catherization is generally reimburseable, while coronary angioplasty
(PTCA), a form of heart catherization may still be considered
experimental. We have evidence that some practitioners have performed
PTCA, billed it as catherization, and probably did so without great
deception.
C. Clinical Trials
By clinical trials, we refer specifically to the large scale,
costly, high visibility, multi-center, randomized, controlled clinical
research activity that often has been supported by NIH, VA, or other
public funds. These differ from the trials mandated by FDA regulations
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in that they are non-binding and typically are conducted after the
medical practice or product has become part of a customary pattern of
use. Design constraints permit these clinical trials to be done only on
a narrow range of therapies for which randomization of patients into
experimental and controlled groups is considered ethical. Therapies
already believed (but not proven) to be either efficacious or
inefficacious cannot be ethically prescribed to one group of patients and
withheld from another by random assignment.27 Clinical trials of drugs
such as oral drugs for diabetes,28 beta blockers,29 and laetrile30
have been aborted by ethical considerations or done without controls.
Clinical trials may be responsible for changing medical
practitioner behavior even if they fall short of definitively
establishing effectiveness or lack of effectiveness for the technologies
under study. They can have high visibility and their results can be
reported prominently to the health profession and in public media even if
published reports offer insufficient information to critically evaluate
the design of the trial. 31 Clinical trial findings are often reported
in academic medical journals, with a broad readership of generalists and
specialists likely to be interested in the information. These official
reports can generate editorials, letters to the editor, and secondary
articles in the same and other publications. This information may appear
later in controlled-circulation journals, which are generally supplied
without charge to practitioners, and which may have even larger
circulation than the journal in which the primary report was published.
Reports of clinical trial findings are also disseminated by
pharmaceutical detail personnel who must remain up-to-date about research





in newspapers and magazines that reach the public at large. These formal
channels of communications may or may not be effective in promulgating
clinical trial results.
Finkelstein and colleagues studied whether the publication of
results from two large NIH-supported clinical trials of oral agents for
the treatment of diabetes and of high cholesterol coincided
chronologically with behavior change of practitioners, and how plausible
was the argument that the clinical trials were responsible.32 Both
trials produced negative results and both were conducted well after the
drugs had become accepted as customary practices.
It was found that the use of both classes of drugs began to decline
at a time which corresponded chronologically to the publication of
results of the major clinical trial. Before publication, the
preponderance of journal articles about these drugs expressed a favorable
opinion toward treatment of diabetes or high cholesterol with oral
drugs. After the results were published, most articles expressed
negative opinions about such treatments. 32 The finding that the
clinical trial of oral agents for diabetes has impacted on clinical
practice appears to contradict reports within the first few years
following the completion of the trial which reported that utilization of
these drugs was still increasing or at least not declining.33 Such
observations were correct at that time, but we can now observe that the
decline in the use of the oral agents for diabetes control in response to
medical evidence from the clinical trial seems to have been not only
plausible, but rather dramatic.
A recently completed survey conducted for the National Heart, Lung,
and Blood Institute has corroborated the observation that physicians were
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influenced by clinical trial findings to abandon cholesterol-lowering
drugs.34 However, the same NIH survey was unable to offer evidence
that the negative findings of a clinical trial of a different practice
(aspirin therapy to prevent myocardial infarction) caused a change in
clinical practices.
More attention needs to be devoted to understanding the impact
clinical trials may be having on physician practice and behavior. The
acceptance or rejection of clinical trial findings by practitioners may
relate in an important fashion to the nature of practices and products
selected to be object of clinical trials. Why are clinical trials
proposed for some practices and not for others? Levy and Sondik detail
decision making criteria that had been used by the National Heart, Lung
and Blood Institute for the initiation of large scale clinical
research.35 Important inputs to the decision included the scientific
basis of the practice whose efficacy is to be examined, the feasibility
of designing the study, and the impact of the underlying disorder on
society. It is largely unknown whether other agencies supporting this
kind of work or conducting clinical trials in other fields use the same
or entirely different philosophies and priorities in their own
decision-making.
The impact of clinical trials on practice and behavior easily could
differ depending upon whether the findings were consistent with the need
to adopt further or to abandon an established practice. It might be
argued that effecting abandonment of a practice might prove difficult
because of the extent of customary patterns of usage which are in force,
although the study of Finkelstein et al does not support this
hypothesis. 32 Adoption of positive trial findings would be consistent
with the direction of the technological imperative and also with the
-RI-·ulaaa·ul---------·I ---
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interests of manufacturers and sales personnel to promote the usage of
products. However, differential impact on practice of positive and
negative trial results need to be systematically studied.
If a practice change takes place as a result of a clinical trial,
it is of interest to determine its character and the mechanism by which
it takes place. For example, is it the kind of change that takes place
relatively slowly as the clinical findings modify or replace the
customary patterns of usage? Or, alternatively, does a clinical trial
have the effect of shaking practitioners .out of the customary mode of
behavior into an instrumental mode in which they are more likely to be
influenced y the nature and extent of scientific evidence available
about the practice?
0. "Consensus Development"
The development of a consensus among a group of experts is another
form of non-binding technology assessment. Used by a number of
professional groups in the past, one of its latest incarnations is as the
NIH Consensus Development Program managed by the Office for Medical
Applications of Research (OMAR). Begun in 1977, its objective has been
to encourage the effective utilization, dissemination, and transfer of
medical technologies. This type of technology assessment has already
been used in at least one other country (Sweden) and is believed to be
under consideration in some others.
Over thirty NIH consensus conferences to date have focused on
particular technologies, some important aspect of whose use is the object
of controversy or uncertainty within the medical community. A group of
experts is brought together to review relevant research and the
state-of-the-art, and to reach a consensus about its value, and criteria
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for determining appropriate uses. Once consensus is achieved, a written
statement is prepared.
The next step (and the object of the program) is to actively
disseminate the consensus statement via the professional and public media
and by word of mouth and hopefully, thereby, to influence behavior and
practice. Among the implicit assumptions underlying the Consensus
Development Program are that: (1) if the topics for consensus
conferences are selected with this criterion in mind, experts will
usually be able to achieve a consensus on the basis of research done to
date (new research per se is not part of the program) and (2) that once a
consensus has been reached, practitioners and the public will be
influenced to change their behavior, if the consensus has been
effectively communicated. There have been only a few instances in which
a consensus has not been reached. The impact of the consensus program on
behavior is currently the object of two large NIH-Supported Studies which
have not yet reported results. Smaller scale studies of the impact of
certain specific consensus conferences suggest that a broad segment of
the medical community is aware that certain technologies have been
evaluated by consensus conferences. However, the nature of the consensus
arrived at by the experts is not as widely known.36, 37
Gauging the effect of consensus conferences in enhancing the
relationship between medical evidence and clinical practice is especially
difficult because these events do not occur in a vaccuum. There may be
parallel developments regarding the technologies themselves or others
that may be viewed as complements or substitutes.
Many of the unanswered questions about the impact of consensus
conferences as a means for technology assessment are parallel to those
j____ss/________r_______ ___
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posed for the impact of clinical trials. The nature of decision-making
criteria that ultimately determine when the consensus form of assessment
is selected for a particular practice or technology needs to be more
systematically understood. The significance of the timing of consensus
conferences before or after a practice has been accepted as customary
behavior by pracitioners is of interest. And, whether consensus
conferences and clinical trials are best thought of as alternatives to
one another or as complements has both historical and normative
implications.
With respect to the mechanism of possible impact of technology
assessment by consensus on practitioner behavior, it appears that
decision-makers may be relying on the social process of consensus to
codify the customary behavior of the professional target group. A
consensus conference might be thought of as potentially generating
exciting or startling new information about a practice or technology in
question. But it needs to be asked just how much information content
there really is at a consensus conference? Do consensus conferences
carry with them more information than a typical review article on the
same subject in a highly visible professional periodical? Is it likely
that a consensus statement is taken sufficiently seriously to cause
practitioners to pay more attention to the scientific evidence about the
practice than they otherwise would or than they typically do compared to
the influence of the practices of their peers?
Finally, it would be of interest to consider whether the active
dissemination strategy typically chosen for consensus statements is
properly directed and assumes the correct model of professional
communication which applies to the largest segment of the intended target
III
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audience, the community of practitioners who may not read journals as
widely as do academic medical practitioners.
V. CONCLUSION
One of the principal aims of "technology assessment" is to bring
clinical practice in line with the scientific evidence regarding the
efficacy of drugs, devices, procedures, and tests. The "assessment"
seeks to settle a controversy through analysis, evaluation, or
consensus. However, "settlement of the scientific controversy", if that
happens, does not by itself necessarily imply acceptance of the outputs
of the technology assessment process, as measured by changes in
practitioner behavior.
We have reviewed various forms of technology assessment used widely
in American medicine today. These forms can be classified in many ways,
but among the most meaningful is by whether they are of the clinical
trial or consensus type, and whether they done before or after a practice
is widespread. This two-fold classification gives rise to four
categories of assessments, and we have described one of each type: FDA
approval process (clinical trial/before), third-party coverage
(consensus/before), clinical trial (after), consensus conference (after).
The effects of all types are uncertain. We know very little about
how physicians utilize information in general. We know too little about
the actual impact of past technology assessments. And we lack the
answers to the myriad specific questions raised above about the
alternative forms of technology assessment.
One reasonable kind of reaction to this uncertainty, or rather to
the perception that actual medical practice is not as closely in tune
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with the best knowledge as we would like, has been to propose other forms
of technology assessment or new organizations to perform them. An
example is the independent institute for health care evaluation recently
38proposed by Bunker and colleagues.
While new organizations and new forms of assessment may be
desirable on a variety of grounds, we cannot expect them to automatically
advance our understanding of how technology assessment either works or
fails to work. If we were to better understand the mechanism for
changing clinical practice in response to technology assessments, new
forms of assessment could be implemented more meaningfully. To the
extent that a new organization were to merely duplicate the existing
types of technology assessments described here, its work would be subject
to the same questions.
In addition, there would always be other concerns arising from the
creation of a new bureacracy of technology assessment. We have commented
on the institutional bias of the FDA. Would a new organization have its
own bias?
More thought should be given to the role of drug and device
manufacturers in technology assessment. Much of the literature casts
them in an adversary role. But while this frequently litigious role is
part of the story, it is hardly all. Manufacturers have their own
interests in technology assessment. They want to know whether their
products work as advertised. They want to use this confirmation in their
marketing. And they want to know of possible hazards and liability
problems as soon as possible. The relationship of manufacturers to
technology assessment as it is practiced and as it should be practiced is
complex.
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Along with entertaining proposals for new structures to conduct
technology assessments of the type we already know how to conduct, we
propose more assessments of the assessments themselves. With greater
understanding of the ways in which information about technology is
disseminated throughout the medical community, we can design new
technology assessments or redesign existing ones to enhance the
relationship between scientific evidence and clinical practice and,
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